MSc IR student Chaitanya Sharma challenges the idea that war is an outcome of poor judgement or overconfidence, as in many cases, leaders demonstrate a resolve to fight despite being aware of the costs of war – not in spite of it.
Introduction
Anyone who has been following geopolitical news in recent weeks cannot ignore American foreign policy. The Western Hemisphere has seen forceful rhetoric and coercive actions following the US National Security Strategy and its agenda to turn the Western Hemisphere into an American stronghold – a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In line with this strategy, the United States has maintained quite a confident posture on the world stage.
This pattern of power projection leads to the question: is war simply the result of overconfidence? Are great powers prone to overestimating their own power while assuming that military power will be effective and ultimately manageable?
Is war simply the result of overconfidence? Are great powers prone to overestimating their own power while assuming that military power will be effective and ultimately manageable?
This seems quite plausible, especially for the United States which has the largest defence budget in the world, are unmatched in their military-technological prowess, and are no strangers to offshore power projection. Such a track record can easily inflate beliefs in what a country’s “force” can achieve.
However, something is missing in this explanation. Recent American actions are not the results of overconfidence that may lead to a rejection of risk, instead, they are supplemented by explicit acknowledgements of escalatory risks, instability, and long-term costs – yet force is applied.
So, if leaders are aware of these costs, why act this way? If escalation is so costly then why do states still rely on it?
The answer to this puzzle may lie away from overconfidence and inflated beliefs, but in the incentives that lie in power projection and how “strength” and “weakness” are perceived in global politics today.
Why the overconfidence explanation falls short
The logic underlying the idea that wars are a symptom of a leader’s overconfidence is their belief in the odds of winning. When the odds don’t turn out in their favor, war appears to be a mistake caused by overconfidence.
However, this is rarely the case. In many conflicts, escalation continues despite a signal – to the leaders – that prolonged war will be costly and escalation is risky. Instead of retreating, states often double down.
This pattern hints at something more in the works, not just miscalculation. Leaders are not childishly clinging onto false optimism; they are navigating the tides of political pressure.
Overconfidence also fails to explain why leaders frequently acknowledge risks before they act. Warnings are made publicly and not via backdoor channels – leaders are aware of the risks they face and they approach war with their eyes open.
Overconfidence also fails to explain why leaders frequently acknowledge risks before they act.
Lastly, the idea of overconfidence cannot explain the political costliness of restraint. If retreat is the rational response (because war is costly) to new information (warnings, acknowledgement of military capabilities, economic damage, etc) then it would be seen more often. Rather, withdrawal or compromise is perceived as weakness domestically and internationally.
The persistence of escalation, in the face of rising costs and uncertainty, directs attention to a deeper logic. It forces us to look beyond beliefs and towards incentives of demonstrating resolve.
War: Demonstration of Resolve
If war is not primarily the result of overconfidence, then how does one understand it? One answer is in how strength and weakness are communicated in international politics. States operate in an uncertain environment. They rarely know the extent to which their rivals are willing to go, or how much they are willing to tolerate, or their behaviours in future crises. Diplomatic exchanges are not as effective when it comes to resolving these uncertainties because, “promises are meant to be broken.”
Actions matter more than intentions and there is a special weight in the use of force, military force more specifically.
War is a consumer in itself; it consumes lives and resources – economic and political. It is costly, and precisely because of that, it is effective as a signal. War signals that an issue is important enough to incur the risk and sacrifice. Leaders may be pessimistic about victory but a demonstration of resolve shapes others’ perception of them.
Retreat sends an unwelcome signal; it can be interpreted as weakness and invite coercion in the future. In great-power politics, failure to act in a moment of crisis leads to shocks that will be faced further down the timeline.
This logic explains why states sometimes choose war despite its obvious risks. War is not chosen because victory is expected. It is chosen because an unwillingness to fight may undercut credibility, deterrence logic, and authority.
By this logic, war is less about mistaken beliefs or overconfidence and more about strategic signalling – a way of demonstrating strength in an environment where weakness is preyed upon.
War is less about mistaken beliefs or overconfidence and more about strategic signalling – a way of demonstrating strength in an environment where weakness is preyed upon.
The logic visualised
Through this logic, the recent geopolitical developments appear less like reckless actions and more like demonstrations of resolve.
In Europe, the Russian invasion of Ukraine persists, despite its great costs, often framed as a miscalculation. Backing down, for either side, has risks that extend far beyond the battlefield.
Recent American behaviour can be understood by the same logic. Coercive actions and rhetoric in the Western Hemisphere signal a renewed willingness to actualise regional stronghold. The United States does not ignore the political, economic, or legal risks their actions carry. They communicate clear messages to their rivals and allies, despite these costs. The Greenland issue can also be understood by this logic as it signals not immediate annexation but a projection of the seriousness of the American national security strategy.
Looking further east, tensions between mainland China and Taiwan further illuminate this logic. Military exercises, arms relay, diplomatic brinkmanship, and aggressive rhetoric are carefully calculated signals.
The red thread across these cases is not overconfidence, rather, a strategic incentive to demonstrate strength in a system that preys upon weakness.
Conclusion
The recent geopolitical events coupled with this logic challenge the idea that war is an outcome of poor judgement or overconfidence. In many cases, leaders demonstrate a resolve to fight despite being aware of the costs of war – not in spite of it. War persists because compromise and restraint are perceived as weakness and carry intrinsic costs. An incentive-led understanding of war does not make it inevitable but it clarifies why avoiding it is so costly in this day and age.
